By one of those familiar conjunctions of things wherewith the inanimate world baits the mind of man when he pauses in moments of suspense, opposite Knight’s eyes was an imbedded fossil, standing forth in low relief from the rock. It was a creature with eyes. The eyes, dead and turned to stone, were even now regarding him. It was one of the early crustaceans called Trilobites. Separated by millions of years in their lives, Knight and this underling seemed to have met in their death. It was the single instance within reach of his vision of anything that had ever been alive and had had a body to save, as he himself had now.
The creature represented but a low type of animal existence, for never in their vernal years had the plains indicated by those numberless slaty layers been traversed by an intelligence worthy of the name. Zoophytes, mollusca, shell-fish, were the highest developments of those ancient dates. The immense lapses of time each formation represented had known nothing of the dignity of man. They were grand times, but they were mean times too, and mean were their relics. He was to be with the small in his death.
Knight was a geologist; and such is the supremacy of habit over occasion, as a pioneer of the thoughts of men, that at this dreadful juncture his mind found time to take in, by a momentary sweep, the varied scenes that had had their day between this creature’s epoch and his own. There is no place like a cleft landscape for bringing home such imaginings as these.
Time closed up like a fan before him. He saw himself at one extremity of the years, face to face with the beginning and all the intermediate centuries simultaneously.
— Thomas Hardy, A Pair of Blue Eyes




Geology of Mind
Freud’s conception of repression is geological. In the Interpretation of Dreams, he writes of “psychic strata” where all of life’s experiences are embedded, across varying levels and depths. Consciousness presents itself at the surface, but much is buried underneath. This strata – layer upon layer of psychic sediment – is at once “unconscious” and supports and shapes the surface.
To extend the metaphor, we walk across this surface, where the plane of consciousness is always unfolding before us. Stumbling into analysis, perhaps even after a fall, Freud’s “archaeological” approach to the mind looks beneath the surface to see what might have tripped us.
Early on in his career, this was an approach taken to dreams specifically:
the work of interpretation is not brought to bear on the dream as a whole but on each portion of the dream’s content independently, as though the dream were a geological conglomerate in which each fragment of rock required a separate assessment.
Pascale Manning notes how this mixed metaphor misses something more crucial, however. He writes that “what goes unnamed in the above passage [are] the narrative gestures that translate portions and fragments into an interpretable whole.” This does not mean that the use of geological metaphor is arbitrary, but rather speaks to the scale of what is to be so grandly narrativized.
Manning continues:
In writing about forces unfolding in deep time or the operations of the unconscious […] Freud produce[s] texts whose aim is to bear witness to gigantic entities that temporally and spatially outscale them and their readers and to consolidate those massively distributed realities into the comparatively bounded territory of a narrative of natural history.
This “reliance on narrative methods that reconfigure natural phenomena” therefore does its best “not to distort or diverge from the human or bio-geological natures they seek to represent, or to contradict the generic conventions and realist presumptions of nonfictional texts on natural history, but rather to engage and reveal the actual world.” What might otherwise be discussed in terms of grand narratives like those found in various mythologies – which Freud was also partial to as well, of course – this borrowing from science makes more explicit Freud’s attempts to found a new science of the mind. But this “bounded territory” of natural history is conveniently static. As is often the case with science, its surface-level presentations are not all there is to its own internal, ever-adapting and ever-expanding narrative of the universe and its structure.
Relatedly, Deleuze and Guattari’s quarrel with Freud concerns a very different understanding of the Earth, which is “permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles.” Nevertheless, “there simultaneously occurs upon the earth a very important, inevitable phenomenon that is beneficial in many aspects and unfortunate in many others: stratification.” There are forces and flows that are not so free, but rather capture and provide form to what might have otherwise been previously molten. These layers of strata are nonetheless multiple. A layer is not a layer without this multiplicity. One ‘layer’ is only a surface; strata “come at least in pairs, one serving as the substratum for the other.”
Geological processes are similarly paired; they are a kind of double articulation:
In a geological stratum, for example, the first articulation is the process of “sedimentation,” which deposits units of cyclic sediment according to the statistical order: flysch, with its succession of sandstone and schist. The second articulation is the “folding” that sets up a stable functional structure and effects the passage from sediment to sedimentary rock.
What does this do to Freud’s geological theory of the unconscious and its narrative forms? “Sedimentation” might here be thought of as the circulation of what Levi-Strauss called mythemes – constitutive parts of myths, recurring themes, concepts, narrative molecules, etc. – which circulate and come to be shaped by social processes into varying forms of narrative. The monomyth, for example – that ‘hero’s journey’ of separation—initiation—return – is found in all societies, but depending on the wider contexts in which the story of the hero’s journey is told, the superstructure is variable and different in each culture. Our interpretations of these narratives may well be different too, even if the overall narrative strata are identifiable across locations. They might be made of different ‘stuff’ or even the same ‘stuff’, but come to take on different forms; the content might be similar, but the expression differs.
This matters, and matter as such refers to “the unformed, the unorganized, nonstratified, or destratified […] and all its flows”. What matters, then, is what asks for coding and decoding. What matters may be what is most solid, identifiable, pertinent, or what is mobile, intensive or extensive, molten. “The word ‘structure’ may be used to designate the sum of these relations and relationships”, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, “but it is an illusion to believe that structure is the earth’s last word.” The ground has a habit of shifting beneath us, requiring new mappings, surveys, and topologies — whether formal or informal.
Fossils
The stories that we tell ourselves are peculiar. I have been thinking a lot about what I have heard in others’ stories, and what they have heard in mine. The reasons why we fixate upon and enlarge this detail over that one, focus on this particular aspect at the expense of another one, perhaps even missing the overall focal point entirely in our preoccupation with whatever comes to our minds – this all has to do with what is buried in our psychic strata.
Are these things possible to excavate? Can we recode the narrative territories we carry around within us? Can we exhume the skeletons and fossils of past lives; mend the canyons of old traumas? Is such a process even desirable? In analysis, are we destined only to become curators of private museums, preserving and stuffing and polishing, locking away to admire with detachment?
These fossils are not always so accessible. Scouring the crumbling edges of what appears solid, backs to all oceanic feeling, risks overexposure to the elements. To bring home fossils is also to remove them from the strata that dates them, locates them, chronologizes them. “How can one still identify and name things if they have lost the strata that qualify them, if they have gone into absolute deterritorialization?” We may be better off walking the beach and leaving what we find, feeling only that this time is ours and what falls from crumbling strata is only the matter of time.
“A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch”, Deleuze and Guattari famously wrote. “A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world […] in the mountains, amid falling snowflakes, with other gods or without any gods at all, without a family, without a father or a mother, with nature.” Here, in nature, “everything is production: production of productions, of actions and passions; productions of recording processes, of distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain.” No nature, then, at least not as a separate realm; only a circulation of oneself within a circulating world; a desiring-machine pulled in and out of myriad milieus.


But still, there is the encounter, the shock of what strata has captured or repelled, returning to the surface for us to stumble and trip over. Something ancient, something ancestral. Not just matter, but what Quentin Meillassoux calls ‘fossil-matter’: “not just materials indicating the traces of past life, according to the familiar sense of the term ‘fossil’, but materials indicating the existence of an ancestral reality or event; one that is anterior to terrestrial life”; an object (of thought) that reveals “the givenness in the present of a being that is anterior to givenness”.
The fossil does not explain. It does not provide proof of anything except a reality beyond our experience. It is not noumenal, since it exists, even if only as a trace of some monstrosity. It is not phenomenal, since the ancestral life of the thing represented is an utter mystery. Time presses in on us, whilst its durations are simultaneously unfathomable. These durations are unfathomable even if we can approximate the dates and evental traces of whatever is registered in stone – what Meillassoux calls ‘ancestral statements’. Indeed, time both outscales us and becomes superficial in its registration.
This leads us to “a rather extraordinary claim”, Meillassoux writes: “the ancestral statement is a true statement, in that it is objective” — ‘this fossil is 3 million years old’, for example — but this statement is also “one whose referent cannot possibly have actually existed in the way this truth describes it.” Its ancientness is registered but not given to us; in a radical way, the fossil is irrelevant to our time. It is ancient, but it is no measure; it signifies some grand expanse of time, but in itself, it is as useful as a stopped clock. The fossil is a trace of a being outside of our time, which presents itself in a hardened form within it regardless. We move outside of time, and must think about the fossil otherwise:
To understand the fossil, it is necessary to proceed from the present to the past, following a logical order, rather than from the past to the present, following a chronological order.

aT THE Museum
Eyes are black holes, but what are black holes and eyes outside of their strata and territorialities?
After a late night spent reading Thomas Hardy, I take myself to the Natural History Museum. The long meander is interrupted by a dérive; a psychogeological impulse is briefly arrested by a psychogeographic one. Across the surface of Hyde Park – a walk in nature – the boundary between recent past and weird present is blurred. Strolling and tripping, it soothes and upsets in equal measure. Surface and depth articulate their doubleness. Two things become true at once.
Later, in the museum, I look into the eye sockets of stony formations arranged in remarkable and monstrous shapes. Taxidermy makes old life more familiar, even if these are creatures never seen living; they appear all the more deadened in their simulacra state. The fossils, however, leave me more ambivalent. I do not encounter them as Knight did, pincered between rocks, faced with the unfathomable depths of death. A fossil encountered in a museum is different to one encountered in nature.
Walking passed glass case after glass case of glass eyes, the stone sockets look out otherwise. There were eyes here too once, yes, but what kind? Whatever sensation emerges feels illusionary. The walls are lined with flattened specimens that gave way to a rocky pareidolia. The feeling is compounded by the eye sockets of the Victoria & Albert museum opposite, sunken into stone by wartime shrapnel. What looks out on the world from these walls? It is outside of time.



Outside
In daily life, fastened into routines and commutes, the outside world is reduced to “a transition: the thing that separates; almost an obstacle between here and there”, Frédéric Gros writes in A Philosophy of Walking. But on a long walk taken for its own sake, “everything is inverted”:
‘Outside’ is no longer a transition, but the element in which stability exists. It’s the other way round: you go from lodging to lodging, shelter to shelter, and the thing that changes is the infinitely variable ‘indoors’.
Interiors become “milestones”; “means to help keep you outside for longer”. In this inversion, “continuity, what lasts and persists, comes from the surrounding landscapes”, and change is felt within. Outside, in nature, in landscapes and cityscapes, in all manner of environments, “it is I who wind through them, I stroll there as if at home: by walking, I take the measure of my dwelling.”
Meillassoux speaks of the outside of time similarly, although by also breaking down the ‘correlationism’ of inside and outside altogether. In fact, this is what happens when we encounter the fossil, which is doubly outside, in “the great outdoors”:
that outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being entirely elsewhere.
This is how it feels to walk through London. I walk around the molten imperial core, buffeted by commuters and tourists who appear superficially indifferent to the givenness of what England is to itself. My indifference to them takes me outside. I walk around foreign territory, alienated and uncorrelated. What is enabled is that great encounter with nothing: “to get out of ourselves, to grasp the in-itself, to know what is whether we are or not.”
Not stuck, but flowing. Production of productions, Knight’s existential horror on seeing the eyes in the cliff face might just give way to the serenity of a radical otherness…

