Fellowship:
On Tolkien and the Traumythic

‘I wish it need not have happened in my time,’ said Frodo.

‘So do I,’ said Gandalf, ‘and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given to us. And already, Frodo, our time is beginning to look black.’


In a letter recently received from Jon Cink of the Brize Norton 5, he told me he was reading The Lord of the Rings. He is not the first prisoner for Palestine to have done so. Juno has spoken of Lord of the Rings memes shared by Lottie Head of the Filton 24 whilst they were in prison, who also found respite in Tolkien’s fantasy world.

The gentle spread of interest in Tolkien’s tales offered both a source of comfort and a reflection on camaraderie. At first, the shared preoccupation with Middle-Earth surprised me. Then, on my second trip to London to spend time with a bailed Juno, we watched Peter Jackson’s adaptation of The Return of the King.

It was far too long and we started it far too late for the viewing not to be interrupted by my falling asleep. But I felt I was beginning to understand the appeal. A few days later, I turned to Tolkien’s books as well.


The epic story of Frodo and his friends is, by now, no doubt familiar to most — maybe overly familiar, in the manner that happens to all things which become engrained in popular consciousness.

We know the story and think little of it. It loses all novelty; its reading unnecessary since it feels like it has already been read collectively in advance. The renowned film adaptations, in particular, turn Tolkien’s narratives into a post-modern myth. But it is always so satisfying to read something overly familiar and see everything in it left out by the collective summary held above us.


I last tried to read The Lord of the Rings when I was 10. Emphasis on ‘tried’. The Hobbit was read to me as a bedtime story and I loved it. When Peter Jackson’s trilogy was in cinemas at the turn of the millennium, I set about reading the books for myself. But I didn’t get far into them. They were slightly beyond my reading comprehension and I remember I found them too much of a slog. But this didn’t dissuade me from a love of his world. I found other ways into it, and began to collect the stories all the same. I tried other tales – The Silmarillion, for instance — and I remember finding a first edition of David Day’s A Tolkien Bestiary in a local bookshop. It was quite an expensive book to buy a kid, but I asked to be bought it for my birthday all the same. I treasured it. I lived in that book.

Probably finding something deeply romantic in the descriptions of hobbit-holes lined with mathom and copious historical manuscripts — found, tellingly, in the prologue to the Lord of the Rings, which I did not get beyond — I liked to collect things from an early age. Old coins and old books beyond my grasp were mystical things. They felt all the more magical for my lack of understanding them.

There is that famous interview with Derrida in his book-filled home — I can’t find it now — where he is asked if he’s read the hundreds or thousands of books that line the walls. He laughs, saying a library of books you’ve read isn’t much worth having. It is better to have a library of books that one wishes to read eventually, or books that will take a long time to understand. My childhood bookshelf was a bit like that. It was lined with many books that felt mystical and which I would not fully come to appreciate until adulthood.

Twenty-five years later, I suppose it is finally Tolkien’s turn. I did not expect to return to Middle-Earth amidst a quiet habit of writing prison letters and despairing at the world. I am reading it now in a new light, knowing it has been savoured by those in prison for trying to disrupt an evil all too real. I am treasuring something profound within it.


The Fellowship of the Ring, as they name themselves, set out from Rivendell with a common cause — to destroy the One Ring and disrupt the spread of a Great Evil.

Many things are required of each of them individually to reach their shared goal, so the Fellowship is soon fragmented, separated and disconnected. They each go on wild adventures, but whenever they cross paths, they are eager to hear news about the others.

No matter what new struggles and challenges arise, taking each of them further and further away from their comrades, they never lose sight of the fact that their struggles are interlinked. Every victory is shared, as is every loss. They all share one Road:

[Bilbo] used often to say there was only one Road; that it was like a great river: its springs were at every doorstep, and every path was its tributary. “It’s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out of your door,” he used to say. “You step into the Road, and if you don’t keep your feet, there is no knowing where you might be swept off to…”

When I think now about those prisoners still locked inside — Sam of the Filton 24 and the Brize Norton 5 — as well as those currently on bail, who no doubt have a few ‘non-association orders’ between them, I think of a Fellowship fragmented but always linked, walking the Road.


It doesn’t take much time after entering Tolkien’s world to find its new resonances unsurprising. Peter Thiel and his ilk have long had a thing for naming their capital ventures after Tolkien’s evils.

Most are now aware of Palantir, named after the “seeing stones” used for surveillance. There is also Sauron Systems — a home security company. Anduril Industries, another ‘defense’ firm, bucks the trend by naming itself after Aragorn’s sword — a rare tribute to a force for good. Other financial ventures, from investment firms to private banks, take their names from Tolkien’s treasure-stuffed mountains or Elven or Dwarven holds.

It is fitting that bands of dissenters and actionists would see the spread of Thiel’s fantastical dystopia and, by contrast, see themselves in the wanderers and little peoples who take seriously the question of what to do with the time given to them. During the Filton trial, much was made of a comment by one of the actionists, who made the comparison, in a scuffle with Elbit’s mercenaries, between the Resistance and the Empire in Star Wars. There’s something about the Lord of the Rings comparison that is more moving, however.

It is an epic fantasy, yes, but its heart lies in the surprising fortitude of an unsuspecting people, who are emboldened to take on a power that dwarfs them — pun not entirely intended, since hobbits are dwarfed even by dwarves. They are emboldened not so much by want but need. Those who would be expected to intervene are preoccupied by their own affairs, like the High Elves who see themselves above the world of Men. Indeed, oftentimes, it falls to those, like the hobbits, who seem to be most distant, most at peace in some other corner of the world, to act. They are more successful than those with power precisely because intervention is least expected of them.


Tolkien himself admitted that his novels were informed by his experiences during the First World War, but he did not see Middle-Earth as an allegory for war-torn Europe. His experiences find their way inside his novels simply because they were his own experiences, and it is human to re-narrate those events that are most resistant to narrativization. In this way, his stories are true myths, straddling multiple purposes, including an escape from horror, but also as a way of narrating horrors anew.

It reminds me of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s writings on myth and trauma. I was reading them recently as I try to make final corrections to my doctoral thesis.

In his long critique of psychoanalysis in Structural Anthropology, Lévi-Strauss compares the psychoanalyst to a shaman, noting how the ‘treatments’ practiced by both are a kind of storytelling or performance, where the aim is always an ‘abreaction’ — a term that “refers to the decisive moment in the treatment when the patient intensively relives the initial situation from which his disturbance stems, before he ultimately overcomes it.”

In various cultures, shamans were performers of injury, in often spectacular and violent fashion. They would do whatever was in their power to re-enact a traumatic experience as it was lived in front of the traumatised. Lévi-Strauss continues:

the shamanistic cure seems to be the exact counterpart to the psychoanalytic cure, but with an inversion of all the elements. Both cures aim at inducing an experience, and both succeed by recreating a myth which the patient has to live or relive. But in one case, the patient constructs an individual myth with elements drawn from his past; in the other case, the patient receives from the outside a social myth which does not correspond to a former personal state.

Story-telling has this function already. If a shaman rehearses the story of an injury acquired, whether mental or physical, in order to ‘cure’ the individual, myths in general serve to alleviate traumas more collective. But what’s most interesting in Lévi-Strauss (and later Lacan) is how difficult it is to separate myths from traumas themselves.

To experience a trauma is to feel like one is experiencing “a living myth“, Lévi-Strauss says.

By this we mean that the traumatizing power of any situation cannot result from its intrinsic features but must, rather, result from the capacity of certain events, appearing within an appropriate psychological, historical, and social context, to induce an emotional crystallization which is molded by a pre­-existing structure.

The Lord of the Rings has served this function in multiple ways throughout the first quarter of the 21st century. It is long overdue a newly traumythic appraisal.


Others have noted how The Lord of the Rings holds a traumythic sway over the millennial imagination. There was a brief summation of the moment Tolkien-fever swept the West around Y2K on Vox last year. Recalling the theatrical release of Peter Jackson’s trilogy and the real-world events of 9/11 and the War on Terror, which happened concurrently, Constance Grady writes how the first film

had a special resonance with its audience because of the moment in which it came out: a mere three months after September 11, 2001. It met an American audience ready and eager to throw themselves into the story of an epic battle between good and evil — one that good was definitely going to win…

It’s a conflation that has all the hallmarks of American superficiality, inexplicably imagining itself as the hero, despite all evidence to the contrary. After all, the drama of The Lord of the Rings is found precisely in its uncertainty, resulting from the pervasive sense that good’s triumph over evil is far from assured. Grady continues:

Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, with its pacifist hobbit hero, is frequently read as an antiwar tract. But to an American audience that felt newly vulnerable and desperate for revenge, Jackson’s Fellowship felt like a perfect allegory for why a “war on terror” was not just desirable but in fact necessary.

Writing in the New York Times in 2002, film critic Karen Durbin ran through the “accidental echoes” between the Lord of the Rings films and the war on terror: “Evil or ‘Evildoers?’ Sauron or Saddam? And how many towers?”

It all smacks of a grimly propagandist desperation to hitch reality onto a myth far from appropriate to an American manufacture of consent.

Even the well-meaning counter-reading towards the end of Grady’s article feels like grasping for some sort of convenient sense-making, as if any other mythical narrative could have served the same ends. Tolkien’s narrative just so happened to be the one made cinematic at that moment. It is a point that Grady observes in closing, finding that the persistent Tolkien references in Y2K culture no longer resonate as they may have done previously to the desperate:

Looking back, [the uncanny echoes] betray how difficult it was for anyone in America to see the world through any lens outside of 9/11 at the time — and how seductive it was to imagine oneself as part of a grand conflict that was both ethical and morally pure.

Overall, Grady reaches for some ambiguous nuance. Americans interpreted The Lord of the Rings as a war of good versus evil, although nothing is ever so simple as that. This is a banal truth — one just as applicable to Lord of the Rings itself, never mind the War on Terror. Indeed, Tolkien’s epic is less about good versus evil than it is about those who crave power and those who are wary of it in all of its forms. One of the primary reasons why it is Frodo Baggins who must carry the One Ring is that Gandalf, well aware of his own power, does not trust himself with it. Such immense power has a corrupting influence on all who might possess it. Better to give it to a hobbit, otherwise ‘powerless’, who can resist its corrupting allure far longer than others.


I have a long way to go on my own journey across Middle-Earth. I am only 100 pages into the 1000-page single-volume epic. But there is a great deal in it that I am finding calming already.

It has been a strange experience, over the last 8 months, to try and situate myself alongside an ordeal that is not strictly my own. My partner has faced the brunt of state violence in the form of the British prison system. I have only wandered by their side, offering whatever support I can — a veritable Samwise Gamgee, steadfast in my devotion to another’s burden. I don’t wish that to sound aggrandizing, whether of myself or others, but the image is a helpful one.

It has been disorienting to leave many comforts and habits behind over the last few months. I do not expect to ever return to them. Life has new priorities, which could not have been imagined a year ago. Nevertheless, the role adopted has been largely sedentary. It has felt oddly administrative at times. It is easy to see oneself as somehow lesser, somehow subordinated, in this position.

But at the same time, I have never before felt so much purpose. A supportive role is not diminutive. It takes as much love and fortitude to reorient one’s life around another’s burden as it does to carry that burden in the first place.

The experiences are of entirely different orders. My experience is my own; it is barely comparable to theirs or anyone else’s. But I long to meet others who know what it is like on this side of the struggle. I wonder what their hearts are like. I wonder if they mirror mine.

The role I take on is one that feels true to myself: to love and support others in what feels true to them. It solidifies a place in a fellowship, no matter how disparate that fellowship may be, and allows for taking one’s place upon the Road.


I think often of Bruno Bosteels’ foreword to Alain Badiou’s Philosophy for Militants:

While ordinarily this category carries echoes of stomping army boots and the whole arsenal of modern weaponry, such vulgar military connotations need not be the most relevant here. Perhaps equally important is the popular etymology that links the old Latin miles to mill(ia)-ites or millia passuum euntes — that is, ‘mile-goers’. We could thus say that a militant, simply put, is somebody who not only talks the talk but also walks the walk, or who goes the full mile.

We are militant upon the Road. We are ‘mile-goers’, and no matter whether we are locked in cells or anxious and alienated at home, we must remember that we do not go alone.

Counter-Terrorism and Neo-McCarthyism:
On ‘Subversion’ and ‘Counter-Subversion’

For yesterday’s article on ‘direct action’ on the Canary, I very much enjoyed talking to Kevin Blowe from Netpol.

In the course of our brief morning chat, he referenced Policy Exchange’s 2025 John Creaney QC Memorial Lecture, which was given by Jonathan Hall KC, the UK government’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and state threat legislation. It makes for quite extraordinary reading, not least because he notes how his separate roles as reviewer of terrorism and state threat are increasingly overlapping. In so doing, he offers backhanded insight into the ‘intellectual’ basis for the government’s confused and draconian approach to the repression of dissent and the ways it is attempting to justify its neo-McCarthyism.

The lecture fell outside the scope of the article, if only because I was already pushing the word count, so I wanted to unpack it here.

Subversion & Counter-Subversion

The lecture begins with Hall discussing explicit acts of ‘terrorism’ — the July 2024 Southport attack being the recent example used. Next, he considers why it is increasingly difficult to distinguish terrorism from threats to national security.

The most interesting part of this section — important for what follows — is Hall’s brief discussion of how ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ was once a novel concept but is actually very difficult to clearly determine. “I do not consider State Terrorism is a useful concept”, he says; “it does not accurately describe the threat posed by States.” This is because it is far from clear how much influence foreign states have on any ‘enemies within’ and how much they simply choose to exploit already-existing social tensions for their own ends.

It is in the final section where things get interesting, as well as logically murky. When addressing the role of judicial intervention in clarifying the contemporary nature of ‘terrorism’ and ‘national security threats’, Hall notes how judicial clarity is essential because

if judicial oversight does not comprise the correcting of errors by powerful ministers, then it may be harder for governments to pilot extraordinary measures through Parliament in response to national security threats.

I am not thinking about an emergency situation such as war…

I am thinking about the measures that may one day be needed to save democracy from itself. What do I mean? I am referring to counter-subversion.

‘Subversion’ is obviously not a new concept in this context, but the more dynamic forms it takes in the present necessitate new and dynamic responses to it, or so Hall claims.

Here, Hall says that ‘subversion’ refers “to slow-burn damage to national security rather than the more catastrophic potential of terrorism”. ‘Counter-subversion’, by contrast, refers to “defending the realm from internal dangers arising from actions of person and organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the State”.

Hall continues by acknowledging that “the very concept of counter-subversion” has fallen “out of favour”, because it is “associated with McCarthyism and some unjustified infiltrations of domestic protest groups by undercover police”. Nevertheless, he suggests that counter-subversive strategies are needed.

Difficulties arise when what he describes sounds like nothing other than neo-McCarthyism. It is further complicated by the fact that ‘some unjustified infiltrations of domestic protest groups’, for example, are both recent and relevant to contemporary state overreach.

Subversive facts

Broadly speaking, the issue Hall identifies is clearly relevant to those worried about foreign interference in national politics. As ever, this is only concerning the UK’s historical ‘enemies’, with no issue raised around the widespread interference of the Zionist lobby in UK politics.

It is hardly surprising that foreign intelligence services would be concerned about this, but the breadth of examples that Hall uses is striking:

If I was a foreign intelligence officer of course I would meddle in separatism, whether Scottish independence or independence of overseas territories or Brexit. I would encourage extreme forms of environmentalism, hoping that policies generated would damage my adversaries’ economy or at least sow discord or hopelessness.

I would sponsor Islamism and Islamist MPs and contentious foreign policy issues such as Gaza within politics. Social media would be a delightful playground for wedge issues. I would certainly amplify the lie that the Southport killer was a Muslim who arrived on a small boat, and relish where an attacker had previously claimed asylum.

I would ensure that the UK hated itself and its history. That the very definition of woman should be put into question, and that masculinity would be presented as toxic. That White people should be ashamed and non-White people aggrieved. I would promote anti-Semitism.

My intention would be to cause both immediate and long-term damage to the national security of the UK by exploiting the freedom and openness of the UK by providing funds, exploiting social media, and entryism…

Hall is quick to note that he has no “evidence of foreign involvement in any of the topics … listed”; he is only “thinking like an adversary.” In fact, “proving that the Foreign Hand is at work can be very difficult”. Nevertheless, paying heed to the possibility of such interference, he suggests that more should be done to counter it in advance. One response, he suggests, would be to strengthen “social resilience against disinformation,” or even advancing “a Cold War mentality that sniffs out subversion” — the latter surely being another euphemism for McCarthyism.

Hall continues on from this point in a manner that is slippery and ideologically blinkered. ‘Social resilience against disinformation’ might as well be inverted to mean ‘social resilience in favour of truth‘, and yet, he is also eliding the truths that exist at the heart of the social tensions he previously listed:

Hall’s insinuated perspective on ‘truth’ is reduced to what is ‘normative’, in the sense that what is ‘true’ is that which is deemed to be preferential for the British state itself. But this becomes an ignorant form of displacement regarding the difficulties experienced by British people which have arisen from the actions of the British state, both contemporary and historical.

To insinuate that none of these things are true — simply because they shine a light on the British state’s responsibility for the disenfranchisement of its own citizens, which is beneficial to foreign adversaries — is an extraordinary example of ideological deferral. This is made all the more apparent when we consider the bastions of ‘truth’ and ‘trust’ that Hall is grateful for:

Truth and resilience require a degree of trust in institutions where the UK is still lucky. The Royal Family, the jury system, the BBC (I think of its VE day coverage, as well as the snooker), the police and security services – domains of institutional trust in which the UK has incalculable advantages compared to the US.

Everything falls even further apart here — not least because the yankification of the UK media landscape is a well-established rot. More broadly, ‘trust’ in the royal family is in shambles and has been declining for decades. The government itself is planning to restrict jury trials, because it doesn’t ‘trust’ them to deliver the results they want in protest trials.

What all of this ultimately leads to is a presumption of ignorance with regards to a nation’s citizens. It’s a governmental rendition of that Principle Skinner meme: “Am I, the British government, out of touch? No, it is the citizenry that is being subversive!”

Governments thus throw their citizens under the bus, assuming that they do not have the ‘intelligence’ — understood in more ways than one — to make reasonable judgements as to their own beliefs and the risk of their exploitation.

Critiquing the West

Hall’s lecture reminded me of a peculiar problem I had back in 2020, which I’ve no doubt mentioned on the blog before.

Shortly before the publication of my first book, Egress, I found myself fielding media enquiries from Russia Today. First, they reached out to my publisher. Then, they contacted me directly. Eventually, they called me at my place of work. The latter was genuinely unsettling and inappropriate. I declined the offer repeatedly.

It was clear that the subject of the book and its contents were a secondary concern to the channel’s producer. Russia Today was obviously not interested in engaging with the finer points of interpretative contention that I was navigating in the late thought of Mark Fisher. As my publisher put it at that time, you could guarantee that Russia Today was interested in the book and Mark Fisher more broadly because he was critical of the West, and they could use those critiques for their own ends.

In the large, Fisher’s critiques of the West are incisive, insightful and accurate. I believe them to be true. The UK is a “boring dystopia“. I know that because I live in it. Indeed, one can recognise that statement as true without wanting one’s perspective on life in the West to be exploited by the propaganda machine of an equally dystopian national broadcaster… Just because Russia might want to amplify critiques of the West for its own ends doesn’t mean that those critiques are false.

Jonathan Hall KC doesn’t bother to make any comment on that though…

It’s only autocracy when ‘they’ do it

As Hall tiptoes around his recommendations for countering ‘subversion’, he both warns against the UK developing its own brand of autocracy whilst euphemistically advocating for it in the same breath.

“It’s one thing to take these steps in an autocracy but quite another thing in a democracy like France or the UK”, Hall says. “Our laws are based on general principles that apply to individuals equally”. But when there’s a group of people we don’t like, there are various ways in which we might undermine them. A group like the Muslim Brotherhood, by way of Hall’s example, might be “banned [on] the basis … that it met a general criterion such as terrorism, or legal criteria that we have yet to invent – separatism, or hateful extremism, or subversiveness.”

The suggestion that legal criteria for separatism or subversiveness be invented is alarming. It is the autocratic policing of political thought, not least those pesky Marxists who might subvert the West through their historical materialism. Hall buys into an ethical relativism that seeks to cast the UK in ideological amber. Never mind all your evidence of state violence, climate breakdown, inequality and subjugation, we don’t believe in all that here. The British are a notoriously boot-licking nation, but to somehow concretise that in law is a baffling self-own.

Thankfully, Hall acknowledges that, no matter how much the security services might be gunning for broader repressions, it is probably a fool’s errand to try and legally define ‘subversion’ or any other byword for what is taken to be ‘extremism’. “There are very many difficulties in achieving an appropriately clear legal test,” Hall says, “and the road to a legal definition of extremism is littered with wreckage.”

Everything is terrorism

What this government has been doing instead, over the year or so since Hall’s lecture, is utilising the rickety frameworks it has already put in practice. Indeed, the UK government doesn’t need a legal definition of extremism. It only needs to expand the repressions already emboldened by its counter-terror legislation.

This was a further point made by Kevin Blowe in our conversation yesterday, which also did not make it into the Canary article. The article’s provocation was simply that the government doesn’t understand what ‘direct action’ is, what it is for, or how it differs from other forms of (equally legitimate) protest. But Blowe added that of course the government doesn’t need a working definition of ‘direct action’. In fact, to formulate one would probably cause the state more problems.

As Hall argues, “if a sufficient definition [of ‘subversiveness’ or ‘extremism’] could be found, then new laws would need sufficient safeguard in the form of judicial intervention”. That sounds like a headache for civil servants and law clerks, so best to just work with what we have…

What we have is the Terrorism Act, the legal definition of which can be (and has been) stretched to cover various forms of protest and ‘subversion’.

The Terrorism Act is, of course, fundamentally racist. It is utilised broadly, but the ideological underpinning of the War on Terror is also baked into it. It has been much easier to apply its various draconian restrictions to black and brown people, and Muslims in particular. To use the Terrorism Act to cover pro-Palestinian protest — as has been happening more and more frequently, and exclusively; they don’t use this stuff on far-right protestors or rioters — is not much of a stretch in this regard. It is sufficient enough to paste it onto people deemed ‘Muslim-adjacent’ in their solidarities.

Judicial safeguards

This is how human rights and freedoms are being eroded in this country. This is the ‘intellectual’ foundation of the crackdown on direct action and jury trials.

Hall’s lecture, if ideologically muddled in its own right, falls back on the view that the judiciary has an important role to play in maintaining certain freedoms:

As a criminal lawyer by origin, my first observation is that the definitive choice between guilty and not guilty made by juries is [the] best and most widely accepted guarantee that laws against terrorism are valid. And when we come to – if we come to – counter-subversion measures, they will be accepted, if they are accepted, by allowing judges to decide.

This lecture is only one year old, but already we have seen how judges have been skittish about their role in proceedings. Clearly interfered with by the government, they have lubricate the crackdown on direct action and civil disobedience, particularly as expressions of pro-Palestinian solidarity. They are not protecting freedoms but allowing the government to wage its lawfare on citizens trying to hold them to account for their crimes in the only way they know how.

Hall might be trying to navigate the minefield of ‘subversion’ in the terms of UK intelligence officials and McCarthyites, but by privileging that perspective implicitly, we find an oh-so-British mask of ‘friendly’ bureaucracy pasted over policies that are, at their core, dictatorial and autocratic.

It is usually embarrassing to invoke Orwell in times like this, but it is hard not to think of him. The UK government does not have the monopoly on truth, nor does its puppet judiciary. If the UK wants to protect itself from foreign enemies, it should have thought about that when it stomped around the world making so many for itself. After an imperial age of the fuck-around, it’s starting to find out. Don’t call it ‘subversion’ when the UK continues to undermine itself for failing to take any accountability for its historic crimes, nor to initiate any remedies for the modern crimes it is complicit in.

Our neoliberal hellscape cannot jettison the ‘right to revolution‘ that even the father of liberalism, John Locke, advocated for. Some things need to be subverted. An increasingly dictatorial and autocratic British state is one of them.