Questions

I pick up a small pamphlet from a second-hand bookshop’s online store about Durrell, written by John Unterecker and published in 1964, as part of a series on “modern writers”. It seems there are few book-length critical appraisals of Durrell’s life and work outside academia, with most appearing in literary journals that are hard for any layman to find or access. Of the few appraisals that have been published, including a biography from Faber & Faber, few are affordable or still in print.

Though Unterecker is writing a quarter of a century before Durrell’s death in 1990, before the publication of so many more books, the unfolding and enfolding scope of his work is already well apparent. “Lawrence Durrell is a man of infinite variety”, he writes. “But he’s a man of marble consistency as well.” (I think of the variability of Deleuze’s folds, the pliant marble of a Bernini sculpture, “infinitive distance rather than infinitive identity.”) He lists the few literary styles that Durrell hasn’t yet mastered, or at least those he has yet to try his hand at. But give “him time enough — and space — and you will have set-up the space-time continuum that, from very early in his career until the present moment, operates for Durrell as a kind of subterranean metaphor — a metaphor for a literary structure that does not significantly change from work to work and on which he has draped all of the superficial variety of poems, essays, plays.”

Durrell’s subterranean writing is contrasted with the autobiographical honesty of Henry Miller, whom Durrell maintained a lengthy correspondence with. Miller said of his friend: “Your personal life is bound up with places, fauna and flora, archaeology, the planets, mythology. You’re always ‘heraldic’.” Each symbol, sign, archetype, character taken up and sketched from memory nonetheless adorns a shield behind which Durrell keeps so much hidden. If Miller transforms the novel through an unprecedented honesty, Durrell follows his lead to plumb more fictional depths, retreating behind the play of human minds constructed.

Unterecker goes onto address the symbol Durrell is perhaps best-known for; how he sketches “in on the heraldic shield … the image of an isolated island, Mediterrranean, sun-washed, sea-stroked.” From Corfu to Cyprus to Rhodes to Crete, each island, always changing from work to work, still “retains its isolating, healing function” in every instance. The sea that surrounds them all, as he writes in The Black Book, “drives up ‘night-long over one’s dreams, washing, forever washing and breaking up into one’s thoughts, purifying, healing, destroying.'” Along this turbulent latitude, Durrell’s own vision of a Millerian tropic where islands gather, “even a lifeline is no good and the diving bell of the philosopher crumples with laughter.” Unterecker adds how, in The Alexandria Quartet, the sea functions as “the underlying metaphor which defines the artist, the artist who ‘finds himself growing gills and a tail, the better to swim against the currents of unenlightenment,’ the man who unites the rushing, needless stream of humanity to the still, tranquil, motionless, odourless, tasteless plenum from which its own motive essence is derived.”

This thalassic undertow, at once surging over and from within human consciousness, is clearly psychoanalytic; a re-inversion of Ferenczi’s thalassa, returning cosmic genitality from matter to myth. But it also responds to many of the scientific innovations of Durrell’s time. Unterecker notes the importance of Einstein’s theory of relativity to Durrell’s landscapes and island portraits, for instance, one important aspect of which, “the Principle of Indeterminacy, effectively cuts the ground out from under the neat causality of nineteenth-century science.” Deleuze’s theory of noncausal or quasi-causal relations comes to mind once again. Human objectivity, in studies of nature especially, is a fallacy. “For when we can never observe without to some extent corrupting the thing observed, we soon find we have to discard the notion of verifiable truth.”


I return to thinking about my own grappling with the habit of writing, all too aware of the corrupting influence that my attempts to understand my social field have on that same social field.

Even my depression, in itself, unnarrated and unregulated, feels like the product of a peculiar and labyrinthian map of quasi-causes. Something happens from without, unearthing something incongruous from deep within, which in turn corrupts, through an intensification from myriad sources, the relations of self-hatred that so many who love me become disastrously involved in.

Freud noted how mental illness is always innately narcissistic, as one understandably turns inward, toward one’s own pain. We tear at the flesh like Ovid’s Narcissus in the hope it will give way to some desired transformation, a transmutation into new forms of life and living (which can, at their most drastic, result in nothing more than life itself overcome). But there is no life begun or ended that does not ripple across the world it enters and exits. We tell stories to make the chaos make sense, but it is all rickety scaffolding. I think of Laura Riding’s cutting prose, taking the nose off both modernism and modernity in one fell swoop:

When a baby is born there is no place to put it: it is born, it will in time die, therefore there is no sense in enlarging the world by so many miles and minutes for its accommodation. A temporary scaffolding is set up for it, an altar to ephemerality — a permanent altar to ephemerality. This altar is the Myth.

In truth, when the logical progression from cause to effect is disturbed, things are not so much ephemeral as they are enduring in their entanglements.

I’m left struggling with the fact that an ephemeral depression, the worst of which lasted a single month (presuming the worst really is over), is going to continue to define my life and many of my relationships for quite some time, living with the aftershocks. What felt like an acutely isolating experience, for me, even as my friends did their utmost to help, affected everyone in ways unforeseen.

I think about what I could have done differently, if anything. I try not to gather up regrets but instead try and excavate some glimmer of rationality from the depths of illness. In the chaos, it is disturbing to reflect that, with hindsight, I had, at times, far less and far more control than first thought. “I feel out of control”, I would say, and yet be commended on doing the best I could. Feeling wholly divorced from my own agency, I have nonetheless, in fits and spurts, done right by myself. But it is also true that many of my own actions were both implicitly and explicitly shaped by the actions of others.

In this way, a very personal crisis was steered by all, at times blindly, nervously, defiantly, intuitively. From just beyond the fray, I feel like no one person — myself included — can really take any credit for the direction of travel. In making various attempts, whether seemingly alone and with others, to exorcise my demons, there was no priest overseeing proceedings; just a gathering of friends, professionals, strangers, acquaintances, each with a finger held tentatively on the planchette, spelling out riddles for wellness on a Ouija board.


In Durrell’s interlinked novels, many of which tell the same stories from multiple, divergent perspectives, it beings to seem, as Unterecker notes, that the various characters are “dancing through a frantic relationship in much the same way that atoms in a balloonful of hot air bound and rebound against one another.” “But we would soon realize”, he continues, “if we were witty enough, that the patterns we saw those atoms creating were — because of our limited (and distorting) visions — patterns as much of our own construction as of the atoms themselves.”

Writing on the work of Joyce and Proust, Eliot and Rilke, Durrell describes how new theories of time, from Einstein but also philosophers like Bergson (whose theories he later admitted to confusing and holding a little too closely together), led to “an attempt to present the material of human and supernatural affairs in the form of poetic continuum, where the language no less than the objects observed are impregnated with a new time.” The works produced at this time of new scientific theory and enquiry did “not proceed along a straight line, but in a circular manner, coiling and uncoiling upon themselves, embedded in the stagnant flux and reflux of a medium which is always changing.” But the self is not so much lost in the continuum, as in many of Virginia Woolf’s space-time-bending novels: “Characters have a significance almost independent of the actions they engage in: they hang above the time-track which leads from birth to action, and from action to death: and, spreading out time in this manner, contribute a significance to everything about them.”

It is a dizzying perspective — indeed, hardly a “perspective” at all — that one feels at risk of getting lost in, wholly abdicating, albeit inadvertently, from any stable sense of self. A quest for the truth at first makes everything known appear false. But the innate relativity and contingency of life also opens up new realms of possibility. As one of Durrell’s characters writes in The Alexandria Quartet:

It is a fancy of mine that each of us contains many lives, potential lives. They are laid up inside us, shall we say, like so many rows of shining metals — railway lines. Riding along one set towards the terminus, we can be aware of these other lines, alongside us, on which we might have travelled — on which we might yet travel is only we had the strength to change.

Travel is another central metaphor for Durrell, although often framed as insufficient, as if we can never travel as far externally, through space and time, as we might hope to internally. Indeed, any adventure across land and sea “takes the narrator only a short way on those ‘immense journeys of discovery’ which in his imagination he constructs, journeys which lead out from the day-to-day chaos of the world, a world which progressively ‘becomes less integral, less whole,’ toward something intangible, unattainable, toward something desperately desired, ‘toward the inaccessible absolute’.” But we may nonetheless discover, in the process, “a new territory inside ourselves in which each one of us who is seeking to grow, to identify himself more fully with life, will feel like Columbus discovering America.”

This reference to Columbus is more apt than it is outdated. We are stalked always by the Robinson Crusoe fallacy, always capable, even prone to arriving in new lands and thinking that our arrival alone is enough to change us, as we set about — perhaps unconsciously — erecting a simulation of where we have just been, for the better and often disastrously for the worse.

“Balancing on the fulcrum of his two identities” — one consciously adventurous, pioneering, brave; the other unconsciously conservative, habitual, automated — “man corrupts his internal landscape in much the same way that he corrupts his external one.” Our impact on the external world, and the consequences and implications of this impact, nonetheless force us to order “the accidental imagery of … life into a useful design”, destined to be etched onto shields, flags, flesh. We are always capable of promoting new flagbearers to lead the way out and in.

More satisfying than those he imposes on his external world, these internal patterns offer man roads on which he takes some of his longest journeys, those which lead him beyond the limits of the self and into the mythical kingdom of the collective unconscious.

But there are far more terrors to be found within than without, and a whole host of characters who are far from agreeable in the heart of darkness. Durrell, at the end of The Black Book:

Is the journey plural or am I? It is a question only to be answered at the outposts.

The quest always ends with a question.

Dream Flats
w/ Kitty & Archie
on Slacks Radio

A little kitchen disco recorded sometime last week with Kitty and Archie of Incursions, and which Archie broadcast as part of his regular Dream Flats show on Slacks Radio over the weekend. Below, a little blurb from him:

We recorded this in our ad-hoc setup in our kitchen, decks on a surface squeezed between the microwave and the stove, with a little bit of room for chopping and cooking beside. We made some dinner and shared songs with each other. Loads of rough bits but that doesn’t feel like it matters… It’s just such a fucking joy to pass music back and forth with friends, ducking, weaving and dancing between the sink and the fridge.

House Sparrow

As the sun rises over my garden perch, I watch a juvenile house sparrow flit among bean stalks and the slats of the fence. It chatters frantically against plastic planters and hops this way and that, capable of flight but for some reason appearing anxious to do so. Birds in fuller plumage chirp around it, ruffling their feathers in the morning air. It looks for grubs among the paving slabs to no avail.

A lively chorus gathers volume from nests unseen beneath guttering, rising to meet the sun. I have been sat here for so long, hunched over my journal, that they seem to think of me as part of the garden furniture, flying perilously close to my head, their wings battering air around my ears. I lose sight of the juvenile, but not once see it take to the breeze.

Untitled
(Three Days of Calm)

Excerpts from three days spent reading and writing in Newcastle city centre.


Wednesday


[…] I booked a train ticket to London to have lunch with my publisher — so much more than that; a deep friendship, formed through an affinity with language and expression. My anticipation for the trip began expanding my world again. I thought of Provence, Languedoc, the Roussillon, the Pyrenees, Catalonia. Last summer, a week spent in the small town of Collioure was the last time I felt content, endlessly inspired in the home of romance whilst weathering the dying embers of a loveless companionship. We had been to the region before, almost a decade previously, when it felt like life was just beginning. It was the last holiday embarked on with my parents, a recce for retirement, before my mother’s mind gave way.

A decade of slow reading emboldened an affinity with the region. From Collioure, I fell in love with colour and texture and the sea, guided by Matisse and the other wild beasts. From there to Carcassonne, where we watched the Bastille fireworks explode above the castle. The city swelled with ghosts as yet undiscovered, the final home of Joë Bousquet, whose wound was embodied through language. Echoes of Spinozist poetry and Deleuzian events congealed with gnostics and troubadours, surrealists and modernists. A world of love and outsides, effortlessly beautiful.


The sun beat down on Newcastle city centre and burnt my skin. Serotonin and cortisol fought for neurochemical supremacy. I was there, by the sea, my eyes affixed to the page with scenes of other lives projecting outwards from the arc of my bowed head. In a separate notebook, I jot down resonant quotations from Monsieur, the first book of Durrell’s Avignon quintet.

The entangled love affairs with which the book begins, ruminated on as Bruce travels south from Paris, returning to his wife, following the suicide of her brother, his lover, begets jewels of love’s difficulty:

… they loved each other to distraction; it was simply the sad story of inversion — it had left him high and dry, without inner resources.

Such is the apparent source of Piers’ suicide: love for another that leaves the self a void. It felt like something I myself was predisposed to. How to steady oneself in company without evacuating all internal capacity for self-care? Writing it all down provides the only solace. “Scribbling all this gives me something to do,” Bruce says, “I am resetting the broken bones of the past.” I try to re-establish faith in life and love through its narrativization. But the people in my life take on the texture of characters in a fiction. I already know some find this alienating, objectifying. The intent is only to make solid, even fleetingly, my amorphous experiences of another. Nonetheless, I’m sorry.

I try and prepare myself to love differently by retreating into books again, turning to fiction if only to return to some semblance of the real. “[L]ove is a real thing — perhaps the only real thing in this bereft world”, Bruce declares as he paces and reflects through Avignon’s pregnant night. “And yet how to achieve the only sort which is reliable, enriching — one with no sanctions, no reservations, one without guilt?” I don’t know, but perhaps the secret really does lie in Avignon.


The word “trauma” has become so ever present in my current vernacular as to lose all meaning. It feels foreign in my mouth, to the extent I can’t help but utter it out loud, a singular point of expression, in a comical and facetious German accent.

It is a word of Germanic root, after all, meaning “wound”. But in my cliched pronunciation, all emphasis is placed on the word’s beginning. “Traum”, in German, means vision or dream. No surprises Freud sought to understand wounding through the free associations of the sleeping mind. But these dreams and visions can stalk us whilst awake. I find myself chasing ideals, promises, utopias that arise from hope but cannot be actualised. Visions of a life lived contently are intolerable in their phantastical distance. I want the thing I can’t have, have never had, like a dog chasing a car with no clue what to do with it if even I found it.


Durrell puts the whole pain of love into sharp relief. The duress my friends have been under, who seem to have come to love me suddenly and unconditionally, is transformed into a thing of beauty and evil. I cannot control my own distress, even leaning into it in desperation with alcohol, as anti-depressants only numb, painfully curtailing the possibility of a cathartic cry and release. I unsteady myself selfishly just to feel something, and then feel so much worse as I see the toll it takes on them.

There is nothing stranger than to love something who is mad, or who is intermittently so. The weight, the stain, the anxiety is a heavy load to bear — if only because among these confusional states and hysterias loom dreadful probabilities like suicide or murder. It shakes one’s hold on one’s own grasp of reality; one realises how precarious we manage to hold on to our reason. With the spectacle of madness before one’s eyes one feels the odds shorten. The eclipse of reason seems such an uneasy affair, the grasp on sanity so provisional and insecure.

My unwellness is compounded by its effect on others.


The long account of Piers’ funeral, the stalking of the hearse to the chateau, reminds me of when Uncle Tim died — surely the start of my mother’s dementia. We pulled up to the crematorium in the family car, and on seeing the coffin as yet not unloaded, my mother let out a devastating cry.

“Oh, Timothy.”

They played “Bye Bye Baby” by the Bay City Rollers before the coffin disappeared behind the deafening grind of a mechanical curtain. No one recovered from the death of the middle child so full of life.


I have been at the cafe-bar in Newcastle’s centre for close to six hours, the sun lingering timelessly in the sky, just a few days out from the solstice — a strange sensation but one that reminds you just how north you are.

A man joined me on the elongated table outside some two hours ago, also scribbling notes. Occasionally we’d write to the same rhythm and nearly overturn the table, although neither of us acknowledged it.

Lecturers are drinking into the evening from Northumbria University, identifiable by their lanyards. I had assumed the man was one of them, but on being joined by a woman, he began expanding on proceedings written down for a wedding. I couldn’t tell if they were bride and groom. He bequeathed various responsibilities to her, apologetically, in a sullen tone. Love lovelessly administered. What a horror.


Thursday


After yesterday’s writing and reading I was drunk and exhausted. I walked to the Cumberland, grabbing some food on the way. I like how much weight I’m losing as I abstain from most meals, a stark contrast to the pleasure of overeating that I became dependent on with my last partner.

At the Cumberland, I briefly bumped into friends, grabbed another pint, and finished the first chapter of Monsieur before heading to a friend’s house and interrupting a meeting that was partly about me. Food was made, the three of us DJed together. By 10pm I was exhausted, flat, got the bus home and went to bed.

The next morning I felt good, clear, perhaps the best I’d felt all month. Something had clicked, although I wasn’t sure what. I set about having the same day all over again, feeling like something was working.


I try to connect Durrell’s Avignon to the literary endeavours of its other proximal inhabitants. I remain fascinated by the aura surrounding Joë Bousquet, the paraplegic poet of Carcassonne, who was enamoured by surrealists, modernists and philosophers alike. “My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it” is the declaration often quoted by all who admired him. Deleuze, in Logic of Sense, interprets Bousquet’s work as always being “a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced within us.” Bousquet, it seems, wills himself to write from in the midst of things, “communicating singularities [that are] effectively liberated from the limits of individuals and persons.” “The actor thus actualizes the event”, Deleuze continues, “but in a way which is entirely different from the actualization of the event in the depths of things.” In this way, “the actor delimits the original, disengages from it an abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and its splendor, becoming thereby the actor of one’s own events — a counter-actualization.”

What is the counter-actualization, the contour and splendor, of a wound? A singularity is not something that refers only to the individual in this sense, but something that spreads itself over everything without delineation. “Everything is singular, and thus both collective and private, particular and general, neither individual nor universal.” After all, as Deleuze continues, “What private event does not have all its coordinates, that is, all its impersonal social singularities?”

The hardest thing to weather these past few weeks has been the realisation that my distinctly personal, seemingly enclosed trauma has had repercussions for my entire social field. An experience that feels so unshareable has nonetheless resonated outwards, bringing everyone closer, even as I feel wholly disconnected.

Writing feels like an attempt to build a bridge, or even counter-actualize my own isolation. Every day spent writing whatever comes to mind generates a double of myself that I begin to make distant. In pits of despair, I write; in moments of clarity, I read. The self read back often sounds morose, self-pitying, unlikeable, and in coming to dislike this self, I estrange it.

René Nelli, writing on Bousquet’s writerly double, suggests that this process is not simply cognitive but embodying and disembodying:

These are not only the glimmerings of a Dialectic of the Imaginary that proceeds by successive abolition or reversal of its image-supports, (the nymph who dresses herself with that which denudes her), but the data of a lived, visceral experience, within which Bousquet aspired, and undoubtedly succeeded, in creating for himself a body of absence that compensated for his absent body.

What Bousquet struggles against, it seems, is the expectation that his wound should leave him broken. From the outside, it would be perfectly understandable, logical even, for his pain to subsume and diminish him. Such is the need, as Nelli writes, for “a kind of logic of the irrational.” To be unwell is to madly strive for wellness, which may feel wholly unnatural in the depths of things.


In Monsieur, Piers’ death is at first framed explicitly as a suicide. It is an end that is hard to make sense of but seems like the only one. Later, it is hypothesised that Sylvie killed him by accident, pouring him too potent a sleeping draught. On account of her mental illness, her constant confusion, she is immediately absolved of all responsibility. But how was it possible that this institutionalized woman, constantly watched over by her stern nurse Jourdain, was able to find herself in such a position? As likely as this new explanation seems, nothing sits right within it, but the uncertainty of the event frees all those bound up within it from resentment.

With no one to blame, the no less unreasonable events that precede and follow Piers’ death become easier to bear. “It is at this mobile and precise point,” Deleuze writes of an event’s singularity, “where all events gather together in one that transmutation happens.” It is at this moment, where “the impersonality of dying no longer indicates only the moment when I disappear outside of myself, but rather the moment when death loses itself in itself”, that the entire social field is transformed. Truth is at its most potent in ambiguity.


It has been said that, in his final years, amongst the mounds of books, letters and papers that surrounded his bed, Bousquet kept Jean Paulhan’s The Flowers of Tarbes closest to hand.

As a study of terror in literature, Paulhan is preoccupied with this tension between ambiguity and truth:

To talk about the ineffable is to say precisely nothing at all. To talk about secrets is to confess nothing. Poets may indeed by devout, but to what are they devout? Writers may know a great deal, but what kind of knowledge is it?

It is up to the poet or novelist to decide whether he is happy with this deplorable confusion. If he has an experience of mystery, and spreads it around, it’s not his business to explain it. He may in fact convey it all the better by refusing himself to it. But there is another kind of writer whose task it is to remind us tirelessly what this mystery is all about, and who seems lost.

Bousquet seemed to see himself as this other kind of writer.


To read those who admired Bousquet, we find them enraptured both by his successes and his failures. Paulhan notes how, for the poet and critic Remy de Gourmont, “a personal work quickly becomes obscure if it is a failure, banal is it is a success, and discouraging in any event.” For Paulhan, we have become confused with regards to what literature owes us. “Even the most modest among us expect literature to reveal at last a religion, a moral code, and the meaning of life.”

What if nothing is left unsaid? What about literature that does not dull but scandalise in its inventions or honesty? It is painful to speak one’s truth and risk the alienation it can bring. An adolescent disregard, perhaps, but one we hope will bring us closer to the world as it estranges us from those we want to understand us best. “It seems, when it is all said and done, that one cannot be a decent writer if one is not disgusted by literature. Just as there is no revelation that literature is not expected to provide so there is no contempt it does not also seem to deserve.”


“I have talked about literature. I might just as well be talking about language: discussions, things shouted out, confessions, tales told of an evening.” But expression abounds in this sense, from everywhere. There is, at the heart of all utterances, “a chronic illness of expression in general”; language that is wounding and wounded, that is both gap and hasty suture.

Paulhan draws, somewhat predictably, on the great failure of language in the twentieth century: the silence of soldiers returning from war, all wounded in some sense by the event. “The right thing to do would have been to interpret this silence as the great mystery, and the paradox, of war. It was as if every man were mysteriously afflicted by an illness of language.”

Bousquet himself was injured at the Battle of Vailly, but the illness of language that afflicted him was a great and copious outpouring. He denied the silence of his wound. But such sincerity often leaves much to be desired. Eloquence is itself a paradox of language that denies the truth of silence, just as silence denies the truth of expression. “There is not a single thought, even the subtlest, which does not also seem to call for its expression”, Paulhan writes. “But there is not a single expression which does not seem willfully deceptive or false.”

I remember reeling from this criticism, levied at my book Egress. One reviewer noted how “Colquhoun’s account of his own struggle with mental illness … and his description of the aftermath of [Mark] Fisher’s death both have the ring of truth to them.” But the book was undermined by the diversity of its expression, they said, veering “awkwardly from high-flown academic prose … to informal” registers and cliches. These are valid comments for any critic to make — indeed, perhaps the only comments a critic can make today. I would hardly declare myself a master of expression, not least in a book that was the product of a first attempt to take writing seriously. I might argue, in my defense, that the promiscuity of my own modes of expression was the point, in a book so overtly concerned with the insufficiency of them all. (And now here again, of course.) A study, an artform, a reflection, an expulsion; “discussions, things shouted out, confessions, tales told of an evening.” Nothing is true; everything is permitted. Nothing is permitted; everything is true.


The title of Paulhan’s study is taken from “a sign at the entrance to the Tarbes public park”:

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO ENTER THE PARK
CARRYING FLOWERS

“The same sign can be found these days at the entrance of literature”, he adds. He quotes Jules Renard: “The art of writing today lies in mistrusting worn-out words.” But what is to be done when one finds a pecularity of experience in our culture’s most worn-out mythologies, as I have done in feeling the resonance of a primal wound in the most ubiquitous tales of familial tragedy? What is it to find, in that most worn-out of tales, a secret not yet revealed in its totality? What is it to find the most obscure experience explored so ubiquitously? To find one’s wound in a great cultural singularity that poetry has exhausted but science and psychology have not yet understood? What was it for Bousquet to find the most mystical experience in the great singularity of the twentieth century?

“I feel like any work which claims to do without deprivation is quite mediocre.” Maybe a work that deals explicitly with deprivation, of one kind or another, can be mediocre anyway. “We only wanted to break free from a language that was too conventional and now we are close to breaking free from all language.” Even more so now, considering Paulhan’s words were first published in 1941. He could doubtless have seen how much further we would stray, and how longingly we would hold onto language regardless.


In our attempts to circumvent the sheer abundance of language, and expressing ourselves anyway, Paulhan insists that one of the simplest excuses writers use to keep writing is “describing feelings or presenting characters that are so out of the ordinary that commonplace expressions would be inappropriate for them, feelings and characters that are so complex that an entirely new language would be needed for them, one that made no prior allowance for them.” But when the experience escapes language, despite being routinely addressed by it, perhaps “a writer will try to be so originally personal that he can only see or say things which are completely unexpected.” It seems that “some monsters have a more durable novelty”, poetic bywords for which become a form of literature in themselves. This is certainly true of the orphan, the foundling. What more can be said in the telling of this story that is not suffocatingly personal? It is a strange thing to move through life feeling so aberrant and yet culturally ubiquitous. The temptation is always to exaggerate monstrosity, but the experience is also more common that we might think.

Nancy Newton Verrier does not draw hard lines in her exposition of the primal wound. I’m reminded of the French use of the word “orphan”, which is adopted at any stage of life following the death of one’s parents. One can become an orphan in middle age, for instance. One can also become displaced no matter whether a relationship to one’s family has been re-established. I have found my own issues echoed in friends who grew up with their biological parents but were nonetheless separated for a time, in that most formative of times, for less final reasons — perhaps because a mother experienced post-natal depression and struggled to rear her child post-partum. How common are these experiences, albeit disregarded for not falling neatly at the most extreme poles of malformed attachments? Scrupulously common experiences require scrupulously common expressions, and yet each still fails the other.


All this might feel like an attempt to self-consciously explain these passages to a critic, to preempt any critique and nullify it, but it is more true to say that writing these words is an attempt to convince myself to still keep writing, to assure myself that it is worth believing in the process first and foremost, and sharing it only secondarily. I am fatally concerned with my own navel, that is true, but as an adoptee it is hard to be otherwise. That these words might be useless to someone else is a distant concern. I only hope that, in the end, they are useful to me.


A little art and a lot of substance, Balzac, Stendhal, and Zola readily admitted — as did Rimbaud and Nerval too. “Your fine poem,” Claudel was told. “Oh, it was nothing to do with me.” Ramuz said: “I am not an artist.” And Taine: “My style comes to me from facts.”

Such modesty is more warranted from such lauded names, but the attempt is recognisable. Such stature is far from desired, but it is affirming to read of their nonchalance all the same. Stylistic considerations are far from thought. All that is desired is expression, and that others might be generous enough to bear witness to it. Does this alone make a writer’s life worth living? A sorry state of affairs if yes, but the answer is hopefully and desperately yes all the same.

“Another no less curious aspect of the illness we are concerned with is that we can hide more easily behind the thing inside us that’s doing the talking.” An inevitability, no doubt, but the intention remains to address this thing in its nakedness, adding layers of thought in all its guises as if the more that is said the more that is pulled away.

“I am astonished in fact to see you begin with a lie. Because you are still writing, whether you like it or not, and you’re perfectly aware of it.” So many of my favourite books begin with or proactively entertain such a lie. The lie, presumably, is that writing is hard. That’s true, but books also emerge from so many people who write through difficultly with ease. I certainly do.

Okay, so the difficulty is rather in the editing, then; in jousting with past selves and then, later still, knowing when to stop. But stopping often comes from exhaustion, when one cannot write or edit the same piece of writing any longer. All the better that this journal is being constructed piecemeal, from various other journals and Word documents (I write in my current journal, already ahead of time).


Friday


Yesterday’s writing session was wonderfully interrupted by a friend. A new day begins, still calm for the most part, although a scheduled visit from the crisis team reminds me just how unwell I’ve recently been.

I try to pick up from where I left off with Paulhan:

Here is what happened, more or less (I think): a woman was walking along carrying a rose. The keeper said to her: “You know very well that no one is allowed to pick the flowers.” “I had it when I came in,” the woman answered. “Well, then, no one will be allowed to enter carrying flowers.”

But some writers chose the strangest flowers, columbines and petunias. “Don’t tell me they come from your own flowers beds.” Others think they can walk around with paper twists for roses. And finally there are those who protest: “Flowers in my hair? Really? Well it’s nothing to do with me. I did it without thinking. I hadn’t noticed they were flowers. They must have fallen out of a tree.” What it really amounts to is sidestepping the need to defend oneself, rather than examining one’s reasons.

My own reasons are clear, if no less worthy of questioning; “I am resetting the broken bones of the past”, as Bruce says in Monsieur. Although I am no physician. Home surgery is reckless, and flits between mending and breaking things further. Trial and error, but always the refusal to let each linguistic graft stick, no matter how much it might at first address a certain dysmorphia.


The friend I met in town was due to go on a date and I asked how she met the person in question. I was oddly relieved to hear it was not through a dating app. The last decade spent in a relationship meant I missed the normalisation of online dating, but now I find myself becoming envious of those who connect with others this way at ease.

We shared the same anxiety around these apps, the false stability of a self presented, the insufficiency of every profile, which in truth shares so little. The problem was not so much an explicit self-awareness but rather a non-self-awareness. It feels dishonest to project something into the social that is so reducticely stable. All the better, if less intuitive, to write a constant stream of thoughts from shifting grounds, embracing the fluidity of writing that journaling and blogging provides. “Words are frightening”, Paulhan declares. Flowers picked soon wilt. It is more affirming to tend and pick those planted only for oneself, each bouquet changing with each season.


To put it simply, we have witnessed the emergence of a new literary genre these days, which has been very successful, and which could be called “justification” or “alibi”. Its common theme would more or less be: “The author establishes that, despite appearances, he is not an author.”

Is the self-negating author, in this instance, someone who denies themselves the label for giving into language and commonplace expression, or someone who attempts to circumvent language and our preconceptions of it? It is “as if literature were bearing down with all its weight on each new writer, compelling and constricting him, so that he is only able to remain a man at the cost of an infinite flight.”


“The Stoic paradox is to affirm destiny and to deny necessity”, Deleuze writes. I write because I feel I must, encouraged by life’s discontinuity to construct a new mythology of the self — one which I am nonetheless always eluding, in fear of stasis on the page. There is always flight in such an expression.

What brings destiny about at the level of events, what brings an event to repeat another in spite of all its difference, what makes it possible that a life is composed of one and the same Event, despite the variety of what might happen, that it be traversed by a single and same fissure, that it play one and the same air over all possible tunes and all possible ends — all these are not due to relations between cause and effect; it is rather an aggregate of noncausal correspondences which form a system of echoes, an expressive quasi-causality, and not at all a necessitating causality.

The writing of the event, fuelled by echoes of a primal wound, links disjunctive affects. What I am attempting to understand, always, is the way that experiences of such drastic variability and consequence nonetheless feel identically world-ending in each instance, or how an archipelago of writers can be affirming when nonetheless disparate links are drawn between them.

Fact and fiction enter into broken dialogue.


There is a cynicism projected onto a current generation, who find themselves enthralled by a materialist conception of politics, unearthing with new ferocity various explanations for how this insane world has come to be how it is. Then, over pints, you construct your birth chart and find yourself irrationally surmised. What a contradiction! But as Deleuze writes, “Astrology was perhaps the first important attempt to establish a theory of alogical incompatibilities and noncausal correspondences.” Physical causality only accounts for so much. There is much more for us all to learn from the cosmic trauma of birth.


I find all of this clarifying, encouraging, calming in some sense. And yet, despite having spent the afternoon away from alcohol, an anxiety is resurfacing. Lower than it usually manifests, I feel a tension somewhere above my stomach but below my heart. There is no immediate cause I can put my finger on, not least because this ball of energy seems distended from any identifiable organ. My mind suddenly feels less clear, but rather because it is distracted by something from elsewhere.

I sip on a pint called Sea of Dreams, a hazy pale, hoping it might remedy the sudden seasickness, dulling the echoes of unremembered and free-floating trauma.


Nietzsche exhorts us to live health and sickness in such a manner that health be a living perspective on sickness and sickness a living perspective on health; to make of sickness an exploration of health, of health an exploration of sickness… Health affirms sickness when it makes its distance from sickness an object of affirmation. Distance is, at arm’s length, the affirmation of that which is distances.

My current sickness emerged from a site of quasi-causality. Feeling a new proximity to love, I felt its possibility was in fact more distant than ever. But to feel lovesick has only helped to clarify what a healthy love looks like, and how difficult a thing that is to truly achieve. Distance is disorientating rather than orientating. “‘Point of view’ does not signify a theoretical judgement; as for ‘procedure’, it is life itself.” The role of writing in exploring and investigating a future wellness is not to establish a theory of self-renewal but rather to deconstruct the messy procedure that felt lost. To feel overcome by suicidal tendencies was to feel the procedure had abjectly failed; my point of view a distorted conspiracy against life itself.

Nietzsche does not lose his health when he is sick, but when he can no longer affirm the distance, when he is no longer able, by means of his health, to establish as a point of view on health (then, as the Stoics says, the role is over, the play has ended).


Communication is an act of compossibility, Deleuze says. (The greatest sadness I feel with regards to my mother’s mental illness is that she stopped abruptly to write poetry, at least of a kind that was expressive; if she writes at all today, it is lists of information, acquired in passive conversation, on disparate scraps of paper, paying little heed to what is actually said, to the dialectical narrative of what is lived, and instead only records disjunctive dates, times and details that never amount to anything meaningfully; she only writes now, quite literally, without rhyme or reason.) “The communication of events replaces the exclusion of predicates.” (My mother only records predicates, albeit wholly out of time.)

The self merges with the very disjunction which it liberates and places outside of itself the divergent series as so many impersonal and pre-individual singularities. Counter-actualization is already infinite distance instead of infinite identity. Everything happens through the resonance of disparates, point of view on a point of view, displacement of perspective, differentiation of difference, and not through the identity of contraries.

Sorry, Deleuze, you’ve lost me, even if all this feels distantly resonant.

If the self is the principle of manifestation, in relation to the proposition, the world is the principle of denotation, and God the principle of signification. But sense expressed as an event is of an entirely different nature; it emanates from nonsense as from the always displaced paradoxical instance and from the eternally decentred ex-centric center.


“Solitude as the world understands it is a hurt which requires no further comment here.” The solitude of the work of art, however, Blanchot insists in The Space of Literature, “excludes the complacent isolation of individualism; it has nothing to do with the quest for singularity.” The singularity of a wound, an event, as Deleuze writes, contains and expounds upon everything. It is univocal, and to speak with one’s own voice, to write or otherwise, is instead to avoid the singularity altogether. “It distracts him by authorising him to persevere.” Because, although the writer might feel wholly contained by a wound, the work itself is infinite, uncontainable. A new event is established, breaking with one’s primal wound. “This event occurs when the work becomes the intimacy between someone who writes it and someone who reads it.”


The reestablishment of this habit of writing, entered into with as much caution as recklessness, comes from a new affirmation of the work never being done.

On a trip to town last week, I bought a pack of slim notebooks and began filling them voraciously. My intent was, at first, self-destructive. Every journal began felt like a suicide note. I would imagine myself writing to the end, then doing the deed. When my suicide attempt, two weeks ago today, was interrupted, it is more true to say that I was denied the opportunity to finish the note. I was scribbling when friends burst in. They later asked sternly, would I have gone through with it? I think yes, if only I had managed to finish the note. Could I have finished the note? Of that I am less certain.

If writing all this down has been calming, it has been the result of an acceptance that the work will never be done. At one time, that very fact was indurably dispiriting. But apropos of nothing, I am writing now in a much thicker notebook, usefully paginated. (I am now at the end of page 41, moving onto page 42, with 146 pages left to go. Will I fill them all? Maybe. But I have an identical journal, unmarked, waiting for me on my desk for when the time comes.)

The solitude of the work refills my own inner resources. (It seems far from a coincidence to me that my present sickness has emerged from a writerly limbo, following the completion of a new book draft, some four or five months before I start my PhD.) But I remain desirous of a life where writing is unnecessary, a life that can be lived without the work, fully with others, where self-narration is discarded like a tattered band-aid, revealing a scar, no doubt, but one that can be lived with, that is picked no longer. (My incapacity for which is no doubt an echo of Paulhan’s questioned lie.)

I wrote little, beyond the new work, an ode to self-transformation, when I moved here. I miss that time intensely. I miss the stability of a life lived far more publicly. The intimacy maintained as a writer with readers is wholly insufficient. I would much prefer a life of real love, of unsanctuoned physical intimacy, of embodied rather than purely linguistic connection. Writing is nothing more than a work, a groundwork. Like any good communist, I hope to work no longer.


Blanchot in The Space of Literature:

No one who has written the work can linger close to it. For the work is the very decision, which dismisses him, cuts him off, makes of him a survivor, without work. He becomes the inert idler upon whom art does not depend.

Perhaps this is where Deleuze’s abstruse language is further clarified. The writer is always at a distance from himself, who perseveres only because the self lingers perpetually on the horizon. “Counter-actualization is already infinite distance instead of infinitive identity.” Disparate books, essays, blogposts sketch the splendor and contours of an event eluded.

Blanchot again; Blanchot still, this time in The Infinite Conversation:

Let us learn to read by reading words that offer a resource to forgetting; there where writing, a writing without discourse, a tracing without trace, takes up again the always aleatory truth into the neutrality of its own enigma… Thus, through fragmentary writing, the return of the hesperic accord is announced. It is a time of decline, but a decline of ascendancy, pure detour in its strangeness: that which, permitting to go, from one deception to another (as René Char states elsewhere), leads from one courage to another. The gods? Returning, having never come.


The work is not over, only paused. I decide tonight to return to the scene of my latest crime. Last Friday, I spent the evening drinking at the Old Coal Yard, not so much to distraction, as I feel newly capable of doing, but into despair. It was a night of fissures and fractures, tears and phone calls to paramedics and psychiatrists. I will not repeat it — only the repetition of another day, a disjunctive series of days, each survived through the work. I will begin again tomorrow.

Cause and Affect:
On Spinoza and Mark Fisher

I have been reading a lot of Spinoza of late. Crisis teams come to visit me every few days now to teach me skills of distress tolerance and emotional regulation, all as a lead into dialectical behavioural therapy. In each instance, as they share their somewhat infantilising metaphors and mindfulness techniques, I think of the Ethics, which teaches us much the same thing. It makes it easier to accept their patronising modes of expression to instead understand each nurse and psychiatric liaison officer arriving armed with their own propositions and axioms, skills for “neurolinguistic programming”, methods for regulating one’s own passions through reason.

It is helping, but it is still hard to internalize Spinoza’s mantra, to “think least of death”, when my mind is, at intervals, refusing to let me do much else. At my lowest, it is hard to believe that the exercise of reason, the understanding of passions and their causes, is enough to free us from their bondage, especially when I have never understood my own trauma better and yet feel it more intensely than ever before. But what is necessary now is rewiring the brain, affecting my own neuroplasticity, so that these reflections are not innately depressive but instead more transformative. Understanding can have no positive effect on feeling if the two are incorrectly connected.

As I try and wait patiently for this to happen, taking each day as it comes, taking time to do the necessary work, I must confess that in moments of morbid desperation I turn again and again to Spinoza’s thoughts on suicide. But I go there digging for hope.

Spinoza seemed to believe that suicide was impossible, and certainly could not be virtuous and good, in that it runs wholly against our nature. “That a man should, from the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist”, he writes, “is as impossible as that something should come from nothing.” But this is only in the context of one’s own nature, of course; it says nothing of how people who do kill themselves are often “compelled by external forces”.

For Spinoza, this is because self-preservation is a core part of our reason. Suicide is unreasonable, inhuman, and cannot be entered into willingly without the overwhelming influence of things outside our control. He references the Stoics, of course, and Seneca, who was forced to commit suicide by the state, and did so calmly and with great resolve, not because he did not want to live, but because he understood the strength of the state and the inescapability of its unreasonable power, wielded by the paranoid emperor Nero. Fully understanding the external forces before him, however, he met his fate rationally. But as bleak as Seneca’s situation was, his circumstances are not the same as ours — although the most unfortunate and persecuted among us may be able to relate in one way or another.

What is worth bearing in mind in reflecting on this example is that the causes of my own emotional dysregulation, in particular, are internal; traumatic echoes of external forces whose power is no longer exerted on me in actuality. And I must remind myself that I survived those moments. Faced with actual danger and distress, I did all I could to survive. It is to be out of sync with my own nature to let them return with a vengeance, to let myself be haunted not by power itself but by its ghosts. It is wholly unreasonable to let them take control from within, clouding my understanding of all the love that comes from without. This is the most distressing realisation from the last few weeks. Nothing that has happened to me recently has been beyond my tolerance. I have lived through so much worse. There may have been triggers, but what has been triggered has been wholly internal. I am not being compelled by external forces but internal ones. That is unreason. That is sickness. To exercise my reason properly is to do what I can to get well.


Considering the insanity of the last few weeks, which has wreaked havoc on my memory, with so many blank spaces taking the place of further traumas, I am doing my best to fill the gaps with Spinoza’s various axioms. But I came to a sorry realisation in the process.

For years now, I have tried to fight these passions, these irrational feelings, this persistent pain that is so easily triggered and refuses to go away. But it is a sad fact that Mark Fisher’s suicide made death so painfully imaginable as a new option and possibility in those moments, with attempts to understand his own actions leading all too necessarily to an understanding of how he could go through with it. It fills me with so much regret to realise that I never had a truly suicidal thought before Mark took his own life. He made it thinkable. That is the true and lasting damage of his death on me personally.

Others have sought to process this fact as well, albeit more conceptually and sometimes, as a result, in intellectually impoverished ways. For instance, I have often rebuked others who did not know Mark personally, who now find his work coloured by his final act, disconnecting the personal from the political, as if it can all be explained away by that great enemy, capitalism, which he had supposedly given up on fighting. But this was not the case at all. In fact, as Tariq Goddard has always insisted, Mark’s suicide was, in the end, all too personal. He recounted his traumas so candidly in the 2000s on k-punk and those who remember those posts will be aware that Mark had more to wrestle with than the drudgery of the 9-to-5. As vulnerable as these posts were, they made it clear that he also understood his trauma better than most. And the truth is that these posts were far more acutely personal than more political essays like “Good For Nothing” suggest to a wider audience.

This is not to diminish the importance or resonance of essays such as “Good For Nothing”, however. They were one way that Mark sought to attach his despair to external causes as he grew older, and the fight against capitalism was indeed a tandem fight against his own depression. But that is not to say capitalism was the ultimate cause of his personal distress. Capitalism played a pitiful role in compounding it, as anyone who has tried to seek help under this system can corroborate. But the internal causes of Mark’s death were nonetheless other. He was haunted by the ghosts of his life, but these were not so much cultural and social as they were more intensely personal. The real tragedy of Mark’s death for his thought, then, in this regard, is not that his work against capitalism might now fail us, but rather that his passionate Spinozism did not see him through his pain. Mark’s work lives on, as resonant as ever. But it is in Spinoza, who he celebrated as “the prince of philosophers”, that the real task of overcoming passions truly resides, and which tragically failed to save Mark in the end.


Thinking about this, I wonder if there’s something further intriguing to be said about The Weird and the Eerie, Mark’s final book, when thought about in these terms. It is a book in which Mark explores how the relationship between inside and outside is not always explicit. The connections between internal and external causes of distress are often obfuscated by structures of power. Mark wrote about this often in other contexts as well, particularly in Capitalist Realism, where he denounces psychiatry’s uneasy relationship with materialism, explaining everything away through brain chemistry in order to occlude a wider system’s responsibility for our own distress. But it is still true that not all distress is the direct product of capitalism — it may all be the product of relations of power, but these can take many other forms and it is not always useful to extrapolate our personal traumas outwards to the cosmic structures that hold us more generally.

Spinoza himself, of course, started there and moved inwards, from an understanding of nature to that of the human intellect, with one a co-constituent part of the other. Mark, in his work, often made the opposite journey, considering how certain ways of thinking about the world are direct products of ideological bondage. We often find ourselves like fish with no concept of water. We do not see the external causes of our own thought patterns.

But Mark explored this tendency for our benefit, rather than to sate his own demons. In truth, it is easier to think the horrors of capitalism than it is the more molecular traumas that govern our lives. But the trauma of abuse and abandonment in early life, in particular, feels no less weird and eerie, when thoughts arise from innocuous triggers, revealing there to be something where we expect there to be nothing, as emotions surface from the amnesia of childhood, felt but not seen. Mark applied this same logic to ideology, but we must still be able to distinguish between ideology and psychopathology. They can be connected but, more often than not, our attempts to lay one neatly over the other are insufficient and do more harm than good. Still, we might start to trace The Weird and Eerie backwards, noting how Mark’s theory of ideological obfuscation can exploit but is not identical to the machinations of the unconscious mind. Still, understanding their connection reveals their similarities as well as their differences.

For Spinoza, what is shared in common is that to exercise our reason in either sense is to understand how passions are brought to heel through a logical appraisal of cause and effect (or affect). But unfortunately, uncovering the capitalist causes of our distress is a far easier process than understanding the consequences of other forms of trauma. In being structural, we need only lift the veil on ideology to see the mechanisms in place that disturb us. Some traumas, however, are not so easily revealed and processed. The real tragedy of Mark’s work, considered posthumously, is not that he gave up on his political project — in fact, he stayed true to it to the very end — it is rather that, for some, political hope cannot easily be translated into something more fundamental, more metaphysical. This was Mark’s failure, and it is a completely understandable one. He always said that “Being a Spinozist is both the easiest and the hardest thing in the world.” Indeed, there is nothing harder in life, and I feel that so intensely right now, as reason feels malformed and in short supply. But that is because the responsibility of actualising one’s reason lies with us alone. Spinoza cannot do it for us, even if his work does hold so many of the keys, connecting each structure of feeling to every other, from the personal to the political to the natural, helping us to identify when these parts of life are out of joint. But in this regard, Mark only really wrote about one aspect of Spinoza’s work. He may have struggled to translate its political application to a more personal one.

There was still so much more work to be done. If only Mark had found the strength to see it through.

Meatspace 2

I’ve received a lot of messages over the last week, many of which I’ve not replied to, but I just want to say thank you to everyone who reached out.

I’m doing well, I’m setting plans in motion to try and access the support I’ve been seeking for years, and I have a lot of very good friends around me to help me along the way. A new dose of medication has turned the volume right down on a lot of emotional distress and, without wanting to jinx anything, I’m on my third day of feeling relatively human. I may be coming out the other side of a pretty terrifying month and I feel like I’m in shock about it.

I appreciate I worried a lot of people, which I am sorry for. I was worried myself. My depressions have been getting worse and worse for a few years now and, whilst I’ve generally steadied myself by blogging through them, a compulsive honesty on the blog was and remains a bad habit I’m going to curtail for the time being.

But things are looking up. I have been so cared for this past week, staying with friends, enclosed in a little village of compassion, and whilst it has undoubtedly been a stressful and intense time for all involved, I could not have seen this through without them.

So I’m okay. Still a long way to go. But hopefully we may be returning to some sort of normality. One step at a time.